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How to Measure Value From Defence Spending? 
The Malaysian Case Study 
Kogila Balakrishnan—is the Director for Client and Business Development (East Asia) at WMG, 
University of Warwick; Adjunct Professor at the Malaysian National Defence University; and the Former 
Under Secretary of the Department for Defence Industry, Ministry of Defence, Malaysia. He is the author 




More than ever, nations and their citizens demand clear evidence as to the benefits of defence 
spending and any subsequent value created. The opportunity cost of defence expenditure against 
other sectors is constantly queried, and the question of how to measure value remains highly 
contentious. Similarly, it is challenging to find consensus amongst traditional economists, policy-
makers, and other stakeholders on how to measure value in the context of defence, where most 
outcomes are intangible. Hence, this article attempts to offer solutions using the case study of 
Malaysia, a maritime nation in Southeast Asia. The study uses a hypo-deductive approach 
underpinning qualitative research methodology. Primary data sources include open-ended and 
semi-structured interviews to produce a thematic discussion, as well as secondary resources 
such as journal articles, government reports, and online sources. The author argues that it is hard 
to appraise defence value, as measurements are case-specific, and even successful attempts 
cannot be generalised. Rather, the paper will use a novel “Triple-Defence Value Framework” to 
argue that value can be measured by dividing the role of defence into a primary level: for 
protection and safety; a secondary level: for socio-economic prosperity; and a tertiary level: for 
soft power projection. The paper concludes by using the framework to measure the value derived 
from the Malaysian defence sector. 
 
Key words: defence value, defence spending, defence economics 
Setting the Scene  
Is Adam Smith’s (1776) statement that “defence is more important than opulence” still 
relevant today? There is continuous debate justifying defence spending, which is often seen as 
unnecessary and providing poor return on opportunity costs compared to other sectors. In the 
United Kingdom (UK), for example, taxpayers continue to question the government’s highly 
controversial decision to maintain, let alone replace, the Trident nuclear submarine fleet. 
Nonetheless, we have witnessed an ongoing and significant rise in global defence spending since 
the Second World War. In 2018, global defence spending totalled approximately U.S. dollars 
(USD) $1.8 trillion (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2020). Globally, the United 
States of America (USA) remains the largest defence spender at USD $648.8 billion (3.2% of 
GDP),1 followed by China at USD $250 billion (1.9% of GDP; Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute, 2020). Figure 1 shows the world’s top defence spenders in 2018 (Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute, 2020). Traditional economists argue that defence is one 
of the few areas requiring “the expense of sovereign and commonwealth,” justifying state 
intervention in the economy. Hitch and McKean (1960), in their seminal piece, The Economics of 
Defense in the Nuclear Age, also highlighted the deliberate choice that has to be made between 
a nation changing its national budget and reshaping its armed forces as long as that change 
appears to gain more than its costs (Hitch & McKean, 1960).  
 
1 Since September 2001, Congress has apportioned an additional discretionary $2 trillion as emergency 
requirements for Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism (OCO/GWOT). 
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Figure 1. Top Countries by Total Spend in Million USD (Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute, 2018) 
The attractiveness of an assessment of the value derived from defence expenditure is 
self-explanatory but difficult to define. There is constant debate over the nuances encompassing 
value and the importance of measuring the input, output, and impact derived. Some have also 
questioned the difference between value-creation and value-extraction (Mazzucato, 2018). The 
topic of value becomes even more complex when seen in the context of defence expenditure. An 
oft-mentioned term in defence is the concept of “value for money” (VFM), which is used to justify 
defence procurement activity and relies on evidence-based claims utilising in-depth evaluation 
and current research findings.  
Most studies have addressed this topic from an economic perspective, discussing the 
subject from a principal–agent model or cost–benefit analysis, often struggling to integrate the 
hard evidence of value derived from defence expenditures. Practitioners in the field have 
attempted to address this topic from a more pragmatic angle, but nonetheless apply several 
economic principles to explain the concept of value and the rationale behind measuring value 
from defence expenditure. Therefore, the author has applied the proposed theoretical framework 
to the real-world example of Malaysia. This choice was due to the author’s familiarity with the 
Malaysian defence context and, subsequently, greater ease in obtaining data, which can be 
extremely difficult in the defence sector.  
The framework has considered input from various sources including academic papers, 
government reports, and news articles, supported by interviews with experts in the field, policy-
makers, commercial stakeholders, and military personnel. The author was indirectly involved in 
providing input and guidance to senior stakeholders when the government developed its 2020 
Defence White Paper (DWP; Malaysia Ministry of Defence, 2020). This article is divided into three 
sections. The first section critically analyses the meaning of value, theories that relate to value, 
and the concept and complexity of measuring value in the defence context, and proposes a 
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theoretical framework on measuring value. The second section briefly outlines Malaysia’s DWP 
and evaluates why measuring value is important for the Malaysian defence sector. The third 
section evaluates how the Malaysian defence sector is delivering value to taxpayers. This section 
also critically discusses the challenges faced by Malaysia in delivering value and raises some 
intriguing questions on how Malaysia can more effectively boost defence value through defence 
spending.  
Measuring Value in the Defence Sector  
What is Value?  
The concept of value received less attention in the field of economics. The theory of value 
originated in the 17th century when Francis Quesnay, a French economist, formulated the first 
systematic theory of value, displaying how value was being created and circulated in the 
economy. The 18th century economics associated value to land and agricultural productivity and 
farmers as creating value. The 18th and 19th century classical economists, including Adam Smith, 
David Ricardo, and Karl Marx, measured value by labour invested in an activity and the successful 
adoption of new technologies (Malaysia Ministry of Defence, 2020). However, the 20th century 
neoclassical economists defined value as a function of demand and supply and saw value as 
utility, or perceived property.  
What is value? How and from whose perspective is value being measured, and against 
what? Value can be direct, numerically-measured (quantifiable), or indirect, such as intrinsic 
value. Value can be labelled as shared value, VFM, or added-value, and even sometimes 
measured by one’s conduct and behaviour. The theory of value examines the subject from several 
perspectives, including ethics, politics, economics, and philosophy. From a utilitarian perspective, 
the greatest value lies in that which provides the greatest utility to the greatest number, whilst in 
a business context, value for a shareholder can reside in profit maximisation, as opposed to other 
stakeholders who may find greater value in innovation. Overarchingly, it is often argued that any 
definition of value and how it is measured is prescriptive. 
At the core of economic thinking, value is defined as price set by supply and demand. 
Hence, when an activity results in a payment, this is seen as value. Value can also be seen as an 
intermediary process or “flow,” such as adding value to a manufacturing supply chain or creating 
new knowledge bases (Porter, 1998). Then there are further riddles as to how these outputs are 
produced, how they are shared across society, whether production is useful, and what is done 
with subsequent earnings. 
Value Derived by Governments  
The public sector is often castigated by some commentators as being “unproductive” in 
delivering value, as government expenditure is funded by taxing the productive parts of the 
economy. However, these critics do not fully recognise public sector contributions in value-
delivery. The simplistic view posits government as an acute example of an unproductive sector. 
Others argue that government expenditure in delivering value should be seen as a process, or 
intermediary, that creates the conditions for a peaceful state, connected through infrastructure, 
police, national defence, and the rule of law that allows for production and services, all of which 
contribute to a nation’s prosperity. Intrinsic value generated through government intervention 
cannot be analysed in the same way as other sectors of the economy. Even traditional economists 
have recognised the important role of government in providing sufficient investment into sectors 
such as the military, judiciary, and other essential public services, as they provide the basic 
institutional and physical infrastructure necessary for economic growth. The public sector then 
pursues identified goals, manages the inputs, and convinces taxpayers of the value delivered 
through spending (United Kingdom HM Treasury, 2017).  
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Valuing the Impact of Defence and Armed Forces  
Valuing the impact of defence is complex, often sparking a debate over the benefits and 
tangible outcomes derived from defence to a nation. Defence is often considered an opportunity 
cost dilemma, with some suggesting it has limited direct economic benefits. Therefore, the 
challenge is in demonstrating the value of defence and effectively communicating this to civil 
society. This value may be intangible: How do you measure risk and protection? How can you 
convincingly prove a negative that defence spending results in threat deterrence? Can we argue 
that defence is essential in delivering the requisite protection and safety to conduct business and 
create order? In defence, measuring direct and indirect value is tedious and often becomes 
subjective. What is being measured? Is it the costs and benefits, inputs and outputs, outcomes 
or impacts? Defence has to articulate how activities improve the quality of life for every citizen, or 
it will fail to adequately justify defence expenditure or prove the existence of viable returns to 
taxpayers (Paul et al., 2015). A common dilemma arises when considering the optimal size of 
national armed forces and defence budget allocations as a proportion of gross domestic product 
(GDP). Figure 2 shows the proportion of defence budget against GDP for the top 20 countries 
with the highest defence spending in 2019. For example, military spending in the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia (KSA) represents 8.8% of its GDP, one of the highest in the world (Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute, 2020). Despite the fact that the KSA remains embroiled 
in an ongoing war in Yemen, is this spending rational relative to the KSA’s overall national 
income? Disproportionate defence spending at the expense of other sectors can diminish overall 
value. In order to be treated as critical, the defence sector and the armed forces must invest in 
the value-creation process in order to demonstrate that their services are essential in both war 
and peacetime.  
 
Figure 2. Proportion of Defence Budget Against GDP for the Top 20 Countries (Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute, 2019)  
Several defence economists have questioned the efficiency of national defence 
represented by the armed forces and domestic defence, and whether they provide value for 
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money (Benoit, 1973; Hartley, 2012; Melese et al., 2015). Defence inputs were identified as 
personnel, equipment, and supporting infrastructure, as part of a defence spending policy. 
Defence output includes measures such as the protection of citizens and their assets, businesses, 
economic infrastructure, national institutions, and natural resources, but also as deterrence, 
warfighting capability, disaster and humanitarian relief, as well as economic contributions to 
employment and possibly even exports. By contributing to international peace and stability, 
defence enables globalised trade, exchange, and foreign direct investment, thus contributing to 
national prosperity through endeavours such as the safeguarding of shipping against piracy. 
Prosperity impacts from defence spending include innovation and spin-offs, human capital 
investments, local economic impact, and long-term influences on local labour markets. 
There are several government reports that have tried to incorporate value into how 
defence policies can impact society. The 2017 UK Defence Industrial Policy (DIP) referred to 
defence delivering “wider economic, international value and national security objectives” 
(Williamson, 2017). The report highlights how defence procurement strengthens productivity 
(especially at the local level), boosts exports, and contributes to national prosperity on a 
sustainable basis (UK Defence Industrial Strategy, 2017). The Philippe Dunne (2018) report titled 
Growing the Contribution of Defence to UK Prosperity was the outcome of an enquiry by the 
National Audit Office (NAO) on the outcome and impact of defence spending to British citizens. 
The report attempted to validate the national contribution of defence and the armed forces and 
measured the contribution of defence to economic growth, national life, people, ideas and 
innovation, and location, five core factors used to justify UK defence spending (Dunne, 2018). 
Again, the 2018 UK Ministry of Defence document titled Mobilising, Modernising, and 
Transforming Defence identified three key themes. It scrutinised defence value through broad 
national security objectives: to protect our people; to project our global influence; and to promote 
our prosperity (3P; United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, 2018). This concept of value was also 
discussed at a January 2020 workshop titled “Prosperity and Value: What is Defence’s Triple 
Bottom Line?” organised by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in conjunction 
with the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) at the Defence Academy of the 
United Kingdom (IISS, 2020). The workshop represented various stakeholders yet managed only 
to scratch the surface in terms of consensus on a definitive qualitative measure for the outcome 
and impact of defence spending as tied to UK prosperity (Wylie, 2017). 
Technological innovation and spin-offs to the civil sector have always been cited as a 
major contribution from defence spending. Many major innovations from the past were spin-offs 
through investment in defence research and development (R&D). The internet was originally 
developed for secure military communication. ATM machines, from which most of us receive 
cash, rely on the Global Positioning System (GPS) for theft protection—originally developed for 
U.S. military communication. Flat screen televisions, radar, laptops, tablet computers, and touch-
screen mobile phones use liquid crystal displays, another invention made possible by past military 
R&D. More recent examples of technology crossing over from military to civil use are autonomous 
cars, the voice assistant SIRI, and thermal imaging. The defence sector has also significantly 
invested in education and training. If effectively utilised, this investment into human capital should 
be translated into knowledge and capabilities that increase a country's productive capacity and 
aid overall potential growth. 
In the context of this paper, the TDV framework as seen in Figure 3 is used to measure 
value derived from defence spending. TDV is a suggested policy framework that could be applied 
by policy-makers and practitioners to measure the value outcome from defence spending. The 
framework was developed using a variety of sources ranging from secondary literature and 
government reports to interviews with stakeholders and workshops attended by the author. The 
data gathered to measure value in this context were mostly qualitative, as it can be difficult to 
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obtain quantitative data in a defence context. The model is mainly aimed at measuring the 
outcomes of defence spending, though it can be argued that specific processes in defence can 
also be counted as producing value. For example, the act of defence diplomacy is a process that 
is highly valuable as it requires complex negotiation and networking to thwart war. Unfortunately, 
such processes do not get captured when measuring value in defence.  
 
Figure 3. Triple-Defence Value Framework (TDV) 
In the context of this paper, we measure the outcome from defence activities as opposed 
to the processes in defence. The primary role of the armed forces and the Ministry of Defence is 
to protect citizens at home and abroad, protect critical infrastructure, prevent conflict, secure 
national borders and overseas territories, and ultimately deliver peace. In order to achieve these 
roles, the armed forces require the ability to access and anticipate future security threats, 
including direct military action and terrorism or cyber-threats, and the subsequent ability to plan 
around specific capabilities required to face identified threats. These capabilities would include 
equipment, training, information, concept and doctrine, personnel, infrastructure, organisation, 
and logistics. The defence budget is then used either to procure the required capability, fund 
indigenous production through the allocated R&D budget, or to enter into collaborative 
partnerships. In the context of the TDV framework, primary value could be derived as the level of 
readiness of units, their warfighting capability, and their subsequent deterrent effect. However, 
empirical measurement of these primary value indicators poses a significant challenge as data is 
either not available or confidential.  
The secondary level of value in this framework is national economic benefit from defence 
spending and benefits to society. The economic benefit of defence spending is derived from 
factors such as the contribution to technological innovations, exports, employment, intellectual 
property rights (IPRs), foreign direct investments, industrial partnerships and offsets, regional 
development through building regional clusters and technology parks, and a number of small and 
medium size industries (SMEs) supported through defence activities. Societal benefit is 
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to conduct business, and an overall reduction in GDP. In economic terms, this is also known as 
protection adjusted life years (PALYS). Second, the volume and extent of participation of the 
armed forces in peacekeeping missions, engagement in disaster relief, border control, sea patrol, 
rescue missions, and humanitarian aid, as well as conducting crisis management such as during 
a pandemic or incidents caused by climate change. The defence sector’s other ancillary societal 
value also includes its ceremonial roles, supporting veterans and their families, contributing to 
armed forces pensions, and adding value through civil–military integration during crisis and 
reconstruction phases.  
The tertiary level of value is defined as soft power projection. Value in this context is 
defined as capacity-building measured through training and education programmes (including 
their quality and relevance); the numbers of trained military personal; and promotion of 
universities, strategy-oriented think-tanks, and other defence-related institutions, both 
domestically and internationally, that can help establish credibility. Soft power is also used to 
promote the “rules-based international order” and may be measured through numbers of bilateral 
and multilateral defence co-operation agreements and alliances, joint-military exercises, 
participation at defence exhibitions, air-shows, and international defence conferences or fora.  
Measuring Defence Value: The Case of Malaysia  
The Defence White Paper  
The Malaysian government published its first Defence White Paper (DWP) in January 
2020 (Parameswaran, 2019). The Malaysian Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) highlighted three very 
ambitious reasons for drafting the DWP (Cheng, 2020): first, to foster a transparent leadership 
process through change in how the government delivers value to the public (Abbas, 2019); and 
second, to inform the Malaysian public on the role of the armed forces, but also to promote 
Pertahanan Menyeluruh (HANRUH; Hamzah, 2016)—or total defence,2 a concept introduced to 
express the collective responsibility of government and civil society in managing security and 
handling crises. The third and most relevant reason is specifically to inform the Malaysian public 
on the value derived from defence spending.  
The DWP was drafted based on consultation and dialogue (Balakrishnan, 2019) amongst 
various governmental agencies, extensive meetings with defence and security circles, overseas 
governments,3 and members of the public (Chwee & Hamzah, 2019). Formulation was 
spearheaded by the Malaysian Institute for Defence and Security (MIDAS) together with the 
Strategic and Policy Planning Division of MINDEF, a technical team from the Armed Forces, 
academics, and the defence industry sector. The final version of the DWP was tabled on 
December 2, 2019 (New Straits Times, 2019). The DWP explains the ministry’s vision, strategy, 
and implementation of defence policy, and has a timeline of 10 years (2020–2030; Malaysia 
Ministry of Defence, 2020). The policy document is aligned to the National Security Policy (NSP),4 
National Foreign Policy (NFP; Ministry of Foreign Affairs Malaysia, 2019), and the National 
 
2 The concept of total defence or comprehensive defence was used by Singapore (1984), modelled after 
countries like Sweden, Denmark, and Austria. The six pillars of total defence include military, civilian, 
economy, social, psychological and digital defence. For further details, see What is Total Defence?, 
https://www.mindef.gov.sg/oms/imindef/mindef_websites/topics/totaldefence/about.html. 
3 During the interview with Vice Admiral Dato’ Ganesh Navaratnam, president at the National Centre for 
Defence Studies (PUSPAHANAS), he stated that the DWP was closely modelled after the 2016 Australian 
Defence White Paper. Malaysia had also consulted other overseas countries such as the UK, New Zealand, 
France and Germany on their experiences of formulating the DWP. 
4 The National Security Policy (NSP) was formulated under the National Security Council Act 2016 (Act 
776). Refer to National Security Policy, 2017, https://www.pmo.gov.my/2019/07/national-security-policy/ 
 
 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 124 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Defence Policy (NDP).5 Nonetheless, the DWP has faced criticism in that the content is not 
significantly different from the 2010 Defence Policy Paper.6 Others argue that the DWP has 
“loopholes” and that it has failed to address the real challenges facing Malaysia, and some say 
that the paper has failed to demonstrate empirical value derived from Malaysia’s defence 
spending (Rodzi, 2019). However, there seems to be strong support from stakeholders in 
adhering to the DWP and proposed plans. 
How does the Malaysian government define value? Is this different from general value 
terminology? There is no hard evidence regarding its usage of the concept of “value,” except the 
term “value for money” in procurement policies. The Ministry of Finance’s treasury circular refers 
to the Outcome Based Budget (OBB) introduced since the 10th Malaysia Plan (2010–2016), used 
to measure outcomes from government spending. Each Malaysia Plan is a 5-year comprehensive 
economic development blueprint prepared by the Economic Planning Unit within the Prime 
Minister’s Department (Portal Rasmi, 2020). Unfortunately, the results are yet to be available in 
the public domain. Hence, the value derived from Malaysia’s defence spending based on the 
DWP in this paper is measured using the TDV model.  
Defence Context  
It is contentious whether defence spending has added-value and contributes to Malaysia’s 
prosperity. It is often argued that Malaysia’s internal security counters more immediate threats, 
and hence is more critical than defence. However, defence is still seen as an integral component 
of Malaysia’s comprehensive security environment. The 2010 Malaysian defence policy specified 
that the primary role of defence is to protect and defend the nation’s strategic interest, with 
sovereignty, territorial integrity, and economic wellbeing as core factors.7 Malaysia is a 
parliamentary democracy with a multi-ethnic population of around 32 million, located strategically 
within sea lanes between the South China Sea, Sulu Sea, the Andaman Sea, and the Straits of 
Malacca, through which 30% of global seaborne trade passes (Malaysia Ministry of Defence, 
2020). As a small littoral state with limited defence capability, Malaysia projects a defensive 
posture whilst actively promoting defence diplomacy as the first line of defence through bilateral 
and multilateral negotiations at ASEAN, regional, and global levels (Noor & Qistina, 2017). 
However, the DWP recognises there are imminent, immediate, and future threats facing the 
country and that a substantive level of deterrence capability is essential. Hence, a credible 
defence force is crucial to protect East and West Malaysia’s land, sea, and air borders.  
Defence Strategy  
According to the DWP, the Malaysian defence strategy is grounded on three pillars: 
concentric defence, comprehensive defence, and credible partnership (Malaysia Ministry of 
Defence, 2020). The first pillar refers to the concept of concentric deterrence that divides strategic 
interests into base, extended, and front-line areas (Noor & Qistina, 2017). The second pillar refers 
to the role of the “whole of government” and “whole of society” and emphasises the importance 
of internal cohesion in building defence resilience. The third pillar refers to building, strengthening, 
and widening collaboration and external relations through bilateral and multilateral platforms. 
However, the document is vague on strategic priorities, how these strategies will be 
operationalised, or the targeted resources required for this purpose. 
 
5 Noor Hisham (director general, Malaysian Institute of Defence and Security, MIDAS, Kuala Lumpur), in 
discussion with the author, February 4, 2020. 
6 The National Defence Policy (NDP) is a classified document produced in 1971 and reviewed several times 
in 1979, 1981, 1986, 1993, and 2006 prior to the DWP. An open version of the NDAP was published in 
2010. 
7 Ahmad Nadzri (deputy secretary general [Policy], Ministry of Defence, Malaysia), in discussion with the 
author, January 15, 2020. 
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Defence Spending and Budget Allocation  
The question remains whether Malaysia has targeted sufficient and effective investment 
towards its defence budget. Figure 4 illustrates Malaysia’s defence spending over the past 10 
years with a total figure of USD $3.827 billion (1% of GDP) in 2019. Average defence spending 
(highest in 2003 at around 2.3% of GDP) has been constantly declining to around 1–1.5% of GDP 
since 2014 (Subramaniam et al., 2018). This figure is still higher than many other ASEAN 
countries, but lower than Singapore and Indonesia. This downward spiral is mainly attributed to 
overall government budgetary constraints and the country’s economic turmoil, but will now be 
further exacerbated by the financial impact of COVID-19. This negative trend has certainly been 
a concern considering the Malaysian Armed Forces’ (MAF) lagging defence capabilities and the 
country’s inability to address some of the critical security challenges both facing Malaysia and 
looming in the region (Hosoyo, 2020).  
 
Figure 4. Malaysia’s Defence Spending (2009–2019) in USD (Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute, 2020) 
Figure 5 illustrates the bulk of Malaysia’s defence budget, of which 77.5% is allocated to 
operating expenditure (OE; Subramaniam et al., 2018). The development expenditure (DE) of 
22.5% is allocated to the procurement of equipment and services, infrastructure development, 
R&D, and other procurement-related costs (Economic Planning Unit, 2018). In the DWP, there is 
mention of long-term funding streams and efforts to reduce the existing funding gap in the MAF. 
However, the budget lacks clarity on projected future allocation, priority of expenditure as per 
services and sectors, and sources of funding. The white paper would have been more effective 
had it shown greater clarity in identifying top priorities. Further, as defence management is 
currently under the purview of the federal government, there must be greater co-operation 
between the federal and state levels in order to realise the concept of “whole of government.” 
Nonetheless, each state has devolved powers to run administrative functions and manage 
revenue and budgets. Going forward, the lack of transparency on levels of future defence 
spending may have an adverse effect on commitments to procuring and maintaining military 
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capability, especially in the post COVID-19 era, unless the government continues to see the 
importance of defence as contributing to national security.  
 
Figure 5. Malaysia: Defence Expenditure by Development (DE) and Operational Expenditure (OE; 2014–
2019) (Ministry of Finance, Malaysia, 2020, https://www1.treasury.gov.my/index.php/fiskal-ekonomi/data-
ekonomi.html) 
Strength of the Armed Forces  
Malaysia possesses a reasonable body of active military manpower, retaining the fourth 
largest military establishment within ASEAN. Figure 6 shows a detailed breakdown for the three 
services of the MAF between 2017 and 2019.  
 
Figure 6. Malaysia: Size of the MAF by Services and Para-Military (2017–2020) (IISS, 2020)  
The ceiling for military personnel has slightly increased from 109,000 in 2017 to 113,000 
in 2020, mainly due to the intake of some 4,000 navy recruits (IISS, 2020). Figure 7 illustrates 
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this to several other ASEAN countries. The army is still considered the backbone of Malaysia’s 
defence and the core of civil–military integration, as well as providing support to the police during 
internal disorders and crisis situations, which are equally important. However, the strength of the 
navy has become increasingly critical in the past 5 years, as Malaysia views itself as a maritime 
nation becoming increasingly vulnerable to challenges to its territorial waters and resources, 
increasingly due to escalated tensions between major powers in the South China Sea. There is 
no mandatory conscription service, though National Service for youth aged 18 was introduced for 
a short while from 2009–2017. Still, since its abolition, there has been interest in whether another 
structured programme should be developed to engage youth into defence.8 Despite a multi-ethnic 
population, Malays form 95% of the MAF and the civil service, with senior MOD officials claiming 
that it is hard to attract and recruit non-Malays into government positions.9 The greater 
involvement of youth and non-Malays in the defence force may be vital in realising diversity and 
inclusion involving the whole of society in order to best deliver value through defence in Malaysia.  
 
Figure 7. ASEAN: Total Number of Military Personnel per Capita of 1,000 People (IISS, 2020)  
Security Challenges  
Unlike some of its other neighbours in Southeast Asia (SEA), Malaysia has thus far 
enjoyed a continuous benevolent security environment with only minor flash points.10 Hence, 
some argue that the prosperity, stability, and peace-dividend being enjoyed by Malaysians is due 
to the government’s continuous investment in diplomacy, international engagement, and defence 
to create a strong and robust internal and external security environment (Noor, 2019). It is also 
 
8 The National Service (PLKN) was introduced in 2003 for Malaysian youth 18 years of age to encourage 
friendship between Malaysian youth of different races and ethnic groups to address serious concerns of 
the country becoming increasingly divided along racial lines. PLKN was halted in 2018 and abolished in 
August 2018. 
9 Malay bumiputra and other indigenous people of Malaysia are also called the “son of the soils.” 
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argued that the threats and challenges facing Malaysia are built on common interests and issues 
within ASEAN, the wider region, and globally (Laksmana, 2018). However, some contend that 
this is also attributable to Malaysia’s “soft approach” in dealing with its adversaries, where it 
refuses to be openly confrontational. There are various perspectives on the external threats facing 
Malaysia, considering both its strategically valuable land and sea borders, as well as the fact that 
East and West Malaysia are divided by the South China Sea (SEA). This paper discusses 
Malaysia’s major external security challenges and issues in the context of the DWP and several 
other sources (Malaysia Ministry of Defence, 2020).  
First, the largest impact on Malaysia and SEA remains the major power rivalry between 
China and the United States. U.S.–China interaction, their positioning, and their competition for 
influence and dominance in the region pose the greatest strategic and diplomatic challenges 
(Blasko, 2015; Chang, 2015). The issues range from flexing of presence, violation of international 
maritime law, and encroachment into the South China Sea and countries’ exclusive economic 
zones (EEZs; Storey & Yi, 2016). The issue is exacerbated by the presence of middle powers 
such as the United Kingdom, Japan, and Australia, and the pressure to take sides through the 
formation of alliances, or regional caucuses. Another potential source of external security 
challenge comes from Malaysia’s common issues and disputes with its neighbouring ASEAN 
countries. This especially pertains to land and border issues, such as human, drug, and animal 
trafficking (often through cartels), poaching, and other effects from conflicts within neighbouring 
states (spill-over), such as an influx of refugees (Malaysia Ministry of Defence, 2020). It is 
estimated that Malaysia loses approximately RM 366 million in tax revenue from cigarette 
smuggling (Sebastian, 2020), RM 6 billion from illegal fishing, and around 980 thousand tonnes 
of sea-based produce annually (Malaysia Ministry of Defence, 2020). Another major issue is the 
long-term poor health and economic disruption due to haze from illegal logging and deforestation, 
especially in Borneo. These threats are not exhaustive, and Malaysia’s rich natural resources, 
diversified economy, and strategic geopolitical location will continue to raise security threats.  
Procurement Strategy  
Malaysia is a net procurer, importing almost 95% of defence equipment and services. Pre-
Cold War, Malaysia mostly purchased Western products, primarily from the United Kingdom, 
Europe, and the United States. However, since the 1990s, as per Figure 8, Malaysia’s 
procurement trend has hugely diversified to include purchases from countries including Russia, 
Poland, Turkey, Brazil, and of late, South Korea and China. Within ASEAN, Malaysia has also 
procured equipment from Indonesia. Government-to-government processes and restricted 
tenders have been a more popular option than open tender in defence procurement decisions. 
There is an emphasis on VFM and seeking the lowest procurement cost, though this may not be 
the case in practise where technical specification and offsets can also be the deciding factor. 
Offsets or industrial collaborative programmes (ICP) are mandatory as part of international 
defence procurement above a specific threshold. Since 2009, several large contracts, such as 
the 8-by-8 armoured vehicles and the littoral-combat ship (LCS), were awarded to local prime 
contractors, with the expectation of a faster rate of technological absorption and a scaling up of 
indigenous capability.  
However, Malaysia’s defence procurement environment still struggles due to a lack of 
knowledge in threat assessment, which leads to a subsequently poor understanding of military 
requirements. Other procurement issues include acknowledging the wider whole-life-cost of a 
capability and compatibility during systems integration processes. Another consideration is the 
need to balance between total dependence on a single source and the procurement strategy of 
purchasing a small number of platforms and systems from a diverse range of contractors. 
Integrating all of these systems to make them work could be logistically challenging, hugely 
expensive, and inefficient.  
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Figure 8. Malaysia: Import of Defence Equipment by Country (2010–2019) (Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute, 2019) 
How has Defence Demonstrated Value in the Malaysian Context?  
Delivering Value at the Primary Level: Protection and Safety  
The DWP states that the primary role of the MAF is to defend the nation’s interests and 
protect its people against any form of external aggression. Articles 74 and 77 of the 1972 Armed 
Forces Act establishes the roles and functions of the three services—army, navy, and air force 
(Malaysia Ministry of Defence, 2020). Malaysia’s primary defence value and the ability to deter 
aggression from foreign nations is measured through the state of readiness of units and platforms 
(Young, 2019). The concept of readiness itself is highly contentious. For the purpose of this 
discussion, readiness is defined as the ability to engage at a short notice in active operations. All 
three services of the armed forces follow a readiness matrix. The inspector general’s office is the 
caretaker of the performance management system, which has been developed primarily using 
the balanced score card method. By nature, it is hard to obtain detailed measurement indicators 
that are currently being used to measure the state of readiness, as nothing is available in the 
public domain.11 Such information is still treated as highly confidential by the MAF. However, 
Table 1 demonstrates an approximate picture of basic measurement indicators for the three 
services. The relevant information was sourced through interviews with senior military officials at 
MINDEF and from the wider defence industry.  
Table 1. Malaysian Armed Forces Readiness 
ARMY  NAVY  AIR FORCE  
 
11 Dato’ Ganesh Navaratnam (vice admiral, president of National Centre for Defence Studies 
[PUSPAHANAS]). Interviewed by Kogila Balakrishnan, January 20, 2019. 
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Situational force 
scoring matrix is used.   
- One collective training 
and at least one live-
fire field exercise per 
year.  
-Brigade HQ to 
undergo infield training 
exercises (FTX) 3 to 4 
times a year 
-Command Post 
Exercise (CPX) to 
demonstrate that they 
can conduct command 
and control.  
-Navy strategy map provides the 
mechanism for ensuring 
readiness on a daily, weekly, 
monthly and annual basis 
(DiRaja, 2013). 
-This is monitored by the 
operational commanders as well 
as the navy inspector general’s 
office. 
-Flying hours for helicopters, 
transport and fighter aircraft 
at minimum of 10 hours per 
month to maintain qualified 
pilots who are operational 
ready  
-Quarterly test provides 
additional qualification  
-Additional biannual 
qualification (not 
compulsory), mainly long 
distance flying and physical 
assessments 
- Annual checks on overall 
operational and physical 
fitness of the pilot  
 
The armed forces organise war games and simulations on the probability of attack or 
aggression from a foreign state or non-state actors. The objective is mainly to use mathematical 
modelling and scenario-planning to measure the level of threat, identify gaps, and ensure that the 
military has sufficient capability to deter aggression. The armed forces aspire to have well-trained 
personnel who can understand and provide accurate analysis to senior military commanders, who 
can feed this information to the National Security Council within the prime minister’s office. 
Despite current efforts, the question remains whether the army, navy, and air force are sufficiently 
trained and equipped to be operationally ready.  
There are several key challenges facing the MAF in achieving readiness. Firstly, there are 
difficulties in mobilising the whole of the MAF and civil service to be capable of conducting joint 
operations. The military is still stove-piped in its defence capability planning, procurement 
practices, and budgetary planning, with a “top down approach” within each service. There is also 
a strong sense of boundary control and inter-service rivalry, which remains difficult to dissolve. 
Mistrust still exists between the MAF, civil servants in MINDEF, and other agencies (Anandhan & 
Inderjit, 2014). This contributes to a lack of understanding on how to develop a real threat 
assessment within the MAF, leading to poor prioritisation when determining the capabilities 
required for war-fighting.12 Further, capability requirements constantly change due to the 
competing costs of maintaining existing equipment versus purchasing new equipment.13 Figure 9 
illustrates the fighting capability across the three services, with MINDEF investing heavily in 
traditional platforms such as ships, armoured vehicles, and aircraft systems, as opposed to air 
defence systems, sensors, or missiles.  
 
12 Azhar Mohamad (lt colonel [ret.], director of business development, BAE Systems, ex-commanding 
officer, Air Force College Malaysia). Interviewed by Kogila Balakrishnan, February 25, 2020. 
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Figure 9. MAF Fighting Capability of the Army, Navy, and Air Force (USD) (Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute, 2019) 
These challenges are exacerbated by buying an assortment of these packages from a 
variety of sources, leading to a subsequently high cost of maintenance and logistical support. The 
last MINDEF budget sanctioned for this purpose 5 years ago was insufficient and did not factor in 
the escalating cost of maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) activities. For example, the air 
force remains unable to conduct modern air operations with the existing overly diverse range of 
aircraft. Therefore, the government must undertake a severe restructuring of the air force with a 
view to reducing the variety of frames in their inventory. 
The DWP has identified a long shopping list of platforms and systems to be acquired by 
the MAF to close this capability gap. These items are focused on emerging technologies such as 
artificial intelligence; cyber capabilities; robotics; Network Centric Operations (NCO); and 
Command, Control, Communication, Computers, intelligence, surveillance, targeting, acquisition, 
and reconnaissance (C4ISTAR) (Malaysia Ministry of Defence, 2020). However, meeting these 
requirements is costly and requires significant investment, especially to upgrade or buy new 
platforms and sub-systems. This leads to the current situation, where the Malaysian government 
must consider if it can fulfil its military capabilities with only 1% of GDP allocated to defence 
spending (Daim & Harun, 2019). Malaysia’s recent defence spending pattern seems to contradict 
the previously mentioned aspirations, with major budget reductions followed by an overall 
reduction in defence spending. Hence, hard decisions must be made to balance investments 
between operational training, equipment, systems, and other areas.  
Delivering Value at the Secondary Level: Socio-Economic Prosperity  
It is harder to measure value from defence at the secondary level. The DWP mentions the 
role of the defence industry as double-pronged: a platform to support the MAF at the frontline of 
defence, but also as a medium that contributes to highly skilled employment, economic 
redistribution through regional cluster development, opportunities for diversification through the 
enhancement of supply chains, and SME development, growth, export, and innovation 
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(Balakrishnan, 2010). It is also argued that the offsets policy is useful for defence industry growth, 
economic diversification, and foreign direct investment. The offset value for 50 programmes and 
250 offset projects amounted to RM 32 billion between the periods of 2015–2020. It is estimated 
that around 3,000 jobs were generated; 1,000 engineers were trained for high skilled work; and 
500 local companies benefitted through new business opportunities (Defence Industry Division, 
Malaysia Ministry of Defence, 2020). 
Figure 10 provides a detailed breakdown (2015–2020) in terms of offsets distribution, 
where 51% of the offsets credits were allocated to local content or industrial development, 35% 
towards technology development, 9% to investments in marketing and branding, 3% to capability 
development and MRO, and 2% to education and training (Defence Industry Division, Malaysia 
Ministry of Defence, 2020).  
 
Figure 10. Malaysia: Distribution of Offsets Credit Value (2015–2020) (Defence Industry Division, 
Malaysia Ministry of Defence, 2020) 
Since 2005, MINDEF has made a concerted effort to increase defence R&D funding. Table 








Transfer of Technology, 
OJT and Training,  
RM11.2 billion




Market Assistance and 
Investment, RM3 
billion 
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& Technology Research Institute for Defence (STRIDE), a government research organisation 
under MINDEF. Although there is a significant increase from RM 2.2 million in 2005 to RM 92.2 
million under the 11th Malaysia Plan (2016–2020), this is still a meagre sum compared to the total 
defence R&D budget of countries with a strong innovation culture, such as Singapore, South 
Korea, and Israel (Malaysia Ministry of Defence, 2020). That said, the total R&D figure does not 
capture the R&D budget of the defence industry and universities undertaking defence or dual-use 
research in Malaysia. Currently, STRIDE, National Defence University Malaysia (NDUM), and a 
few other universities and research organisations are involved in defence R&D. Considering the 
negligible size of government defence R&D investment, it is unsurprising that there is little hard 
evidence of patents, licenses, key technology spin-outs, or start-ups, let alone publications of 
international standing. Overall, defence R&D investments have not yielded substantive benefits.  
Table 2. Malaysia’s Defence Spending (Science, Technology, Research Institute for Defence (STRIDE), 
Ministry of Defence, 2020) 
Malaysia Plan  Development Budget for STRIDE 
8th Malaysia Plan 
2005 – 2010 
RM2.2 million 
9th Malaysia Plan 
2006 – 2010 
RM17.5 million 
10th Malaysia Plan 
2011 – 2015 
RM10 million 
11th Malaysia Plan 
2016 – 2020 
RM92.2 million 
 
Malaysia has yet to penetrate the defence export market but has made headway with dual-
use exports. Offsets have been used to enter the international defence supply chain for large 
OEMs, with companies such as Composite Technology Research Malaysia (CTRM), Contraves 
Advanced Defence (CAD), and Sapura Defence exporting parts and components (Malaysia 
Ministry of Defence, 2020). The defence sector has also been a catalyst to the development of 
several industrial clusters around Malaysia, including a maritime cluster in Lumut, an aerospace 
cluster in Subang, and an automotive cluster in Pekan. These clusters contribute mainly towards 
dual-use industrial activities that assist in creating wider socio-economic impact and long-term 
multipliers. However, the sustainability of these clusters is highly contentious. Participation from 
commercial entities, the level of civil-defence integration, assessing the real value of collaborative 
activities, and the level of integration within these clusters all pose challenges. Several SMEs 
were outsourced work through defence contracts and offsets agreements.  
Hence, there is the question of whether defence spending allocations towards R&D, 
offsets, and sustaining a defence industry are commensurate with the expected outcomes. 
Despite arguments against the economic value of defence to the Malaysian economy, Malaysia 
has been successful in using defence spending for dual-use activities and in capturing commercial 
business and technology. The defence industrial sector that began with a strong footing in the 
1980s and 1990s, and seemed to be on an upward trajectory, has slipped in the past 10 years 
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due to a lack of vision and focus, poor leadership, and mismanagement of funds within the 
defence environment (Balakrishnan, 2008). The defence industrial sector has had difficulties in 
adapting to the changing defence ecosystem, struggling to embrace the adoption of new 
innovative ideas in developing the sector (Balakrishnan, 2008). Overdependence on the 
government as the single source of contracts, corrupt procurement practises, a lack of appetite 
for investment in innovation, and low technological absorption capability have combined to create 
a gloomy outlook for this sector (Hughes, 2011).14 Despite huge investments into the defence 
industry sector, R&D, as well as offsets, there is an overall lack of compelling evidence that there 
have been substantive contributions to the economy from defence (Bitzinger, 2017). Despite more 
than 20 years of investment into offsets, Malaysia’s defence industry sector has not progressed 
and is still hugely dependent on foreign suppliers. Furthermore, recent controversial decisions 
around the trading of commodities such as palm oil for defence equipment may further erode the 
chances of rebuilding the defence industrial base via government-to-government technology 
transfer agreements, offsets, and industrial collaboration programmes (Grevatt, 2019).  
As Malaysia has a relatively small defence industry, stretched in terms of budget but 
hugely concentrated in high-technology sectors including electronics and semiconductors, the 
economy will see significant benefits if the defence industry focuses its efforts and investments 
into dual-use technology fields such as autonomous vehicles, systems integration, data science, 
cyber security, radars, space technology, and battery technology (Lele, 2013). Defence 
technology should be strategically positioned not just for deterrence, but also for contribution to 
overall national industrial policy focused on dual-use technology. There is a need to engage larger 
defence companies (primes) with SMEs to tap into commercial technologies and encourage open 
innovation, as most technological innovation today is a spin-off from smaller SMEs and start-ups. 
The Defence Industry Blueprint is said to address some of these shortfalls and encourage the 
development of strategic drivers to focus on how the defence industry could be more effective, 
but this is yet to be seen (Balakrishnan & Matthews, 2009). There is also mention that 10–15% of 
all nominal offsets value from industry collaboration will be allocated for R&D purposes (Malaysia 
Ministry of Defence, 2020).  
However, there are many unanswered questions concerning the implementation of 
allocated funds and whether there will be similar commitments from the industry in the form of 
matching grants to access the funding. Further issues lie in accountability, disbursement criteria, 
as well as selection of projects. Perhaps now is the time to develop a separate technology-based 
entity to support human capability development in emerging technology areas, such as C4ISTAR 
and NCO, by reaching out to non-traditional defence suppliers, small- and medium-sized 
enterprises and academia, as well as traditional defence suppliers, in order to develop new 
capabilities for Malaysia’s defence sector (United Kingdom - Defence Science and Technology 
Laboratory, 2018).  
As current trends demonstrate that most of the emerging technology innovation originates 
from the commercial sector, defence must strive to gain access to such technologies as robotics, 
autonomous vehicles/vessels, cyberspace, artificial intelligence, and space. The offsets funding 
allocated to defence R&D should be governed appropriately and used for defence-specific 
technologies that cannot be offered by the commercial sectors, such as radar, missile 
technologies, weapons technologies, and ammunition. The R&D allocation could be more 
effectively utilised by introducing more attractive incentives, such as the patent box scheme 
 
14 Chris Hughes (2011), in his paper, discussed three major challenges for Japan: budget to meet the 
long-term military demand, procurement management and international collaboration as solutions for 
Japan’s revival of its defence industrial base, and “techno nationalism.” 
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whereby companies receive tax credits in return for money spent on R&D (United Kingdom 
Government, 2020).  
Furthermore, the civil offsets programme requires restructuring in order to maximise 
technology transfer from civil prime companies. This is necessitated by the fact that emerging 
technologies in civil sectors reside with tech giants such as Google, Facebook, Apple, Microsoft, 
and Uber. The government should also set up an organisation (United Kingdom - Innovate UK, 
2020) that funds and capitalises on innovation to support Malaysia’s defence prosperity and value 
(United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, 2019). This should be supported by the building of an 
innovation network consisting of government, private sector, academia, and industry to fund and 
supply emerging defence industry and SMEs with both human and physical capital, as well as 
developing innovative ideas that can be translated into products and services (United Kingdom 
Ministry of Defence, 2020).  
The Malaysian defence sector also performs secondary roles in delivering valuable 
societal services such as carrying out humanitarian and disaster relief, search and rescue, and 
non-combatant evacuation operations as part of the United Nations (UN) charter and protection 
of critical national infrastructure. Malaysia is part of the ASEAN Humanitarian Aid and Disaster 
Relief (HDRF) military readiness group. In 2010, Malaysia wanted to demonstrate leadership as 
part of UNHRD and set up a World Food Programme (WFP) logistics centre at Subang airport, 
acting as a centre for humanitarian relief items within 48 hours of crisis. The armed forces also 
collaborate with the Federation of Red Cross, Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), and the 
International Council of Red Cross (ICRC) to strengthen international humanitarian law. For 
example, the military was called to support Rohingya refugees by lending the A400M aircraft to 
transport medical personnel to Bangladesh in 2017 (Malaysia Ministry of Defence, 2020). The 
MAF have been involved in 40 peacekeeping missions, the first in the Republic of Congo (1960–
1964), and most recently in Yemen (2019) until now. Other active missions include Darfur and 
South Sudan since 2007, Liberia since 2003, West Sahara since 1991, Philippines since 2004, 
Lebanon since 2007, and Bangladesh since 2017 (United Kingdom - Innovate UK, 2020). The 
COVID-19 pandemic also highlighted how the military supports the police force and medical 
professionals during a national crisis through patrols, use of military hospitals and doctors, as well 
as military equipment for airlift and fast transportation.  
The immediate value question is whether Malaysian taxpayers should fund humanitarian 
aid and peacekeeping missions in distant places. What value does this create for the citizens? 
One argument is that these activities demonstrate that Malaysia is a mature and reliable nation 
capable of contributing to collective world peace and international order.  
Delivering Value at the Tertiary Level: Soft Power Projection  
Despite being a small maritime nation, Malaysia aspires to be a SEA lynchpin for the wider 
region (Subramaniam et al., 2018). Strategically, it remains firmly supportive of the international 
world order and democratic values and objectives whilst retaining a deep historical suspicion of 
Chinese objectives and intentions in the region. Malaysia attempts to exert its values through 
bilateral and multilateral engagement, joint-training exercises, and by sending military and civilian 
MOD officials for training overseas. Malaysia has also built traditional partnerships with non-
ASEAN countries in the region, such as with India, Pakistan, and Japan, focused on joint 
exercises and training.  
As part of defence diplomacy, Malaysia has established defence bilateral co-operation 
with individual ASEAN countries to enhance primary capability and save money through the 
sharing of capabilities. Malaysia’s history of defence bilateral co-operation began with Thailand 
(1965) and Indonesia (1972) through the Government Border Control (GBC) agreement. Since 
then, it has signed a dozen other bilateral defence MOUs with Brunei (1992), Philippines (1994), 
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Vietnam (2008), Cambodia (2018) and Laos PDR (2019). It is in the interest of the armed forces 
to build strong defence links and negotiate for the procurement of common platforms and 
systems, which can then lead to better interoperability.  
The FPDA, or the Five Power Defence Arrangement (1971), is the only apolitical, 
multilateral platform formed predominantly for joint-military exercises amongst the United 
Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and Singapore. The FPDA is said to contribute to 
Malaysia’s primary defence value, as the platform is used for integrated air defence capability, 
the sharing of resources and intelligence, as well as maintaining existing assets.  
At the global level, the Malaysian Armed Forces have also built defence co-operation with 
the United States, China, Australia, France, and the United Kingdom, mainly focused on 
combined military exercises, courses, training, exchange of visits and intelligence discussions.15 
Platforms such as the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM) and ADMM Plus are used to 
communicate the importance of enhancing national security and expressing how each nation 
views the others’ power projection on overlapping conflicts.16 Malaysian military personnel mostly 
attend courses at local universities, with some also attending courses and undertaking degree 
programmes using government and foreign-funded scholarships to prestigious universities in the 
United States, United Kingdom, Australia, and France.17 Military personnel are seen as a high 
value human resource—especially in the technology sector—assuming that the average military 
career is less than 10 years in length. However, if it is significantly longer than that, the value of 
retiring military personnel to the civil sector may be reduced.  
Conclusion  
This paper set out to measure the value derived from defence spending. Historically, this topic 
has proven to be challenging and problematic, but this does not imply that the armed forces and 
the defence sector do not have to prove that value is derived from defence spending and make 
efforts to improve the overall impact of defence. Unfortunately, few countries have tried to 
measure this. To do so, we constructed the TDV framework. The TDV framework, divided into 
primary, secondary, and tertiary levels, can be applied to analyse any country’s defence 
investment. Extrapolations using this framework should be modified by each nation according to 
its context. One has learned through its application that it becomes increasingly harder to 
demonstrate value as we move down the value-chain from the primary to the tertiary level. The 
paper argues that at the primary level, the most critical value measurement is associated with the 
level of protection and safety that is provided to a nation and its citizens by the armed forces and 
defence sector. This is determined by the ability of the armed forces to deter aggression, 
precipitated by ensuring readiness and building sufficient capability. At the secondary level, value 
is measured through socio-economic prosperity, and finally, at the tertiary level, value arises 
through soft-power projection to demonstrate the criticality of a nation in its geopolitical and 
strategic positioning. 
Covering Malaysia, the paper applied the TDV framework to analyse the value derived from its 
defence spending. The TDV was a useful evaluation tool to understand Malaysia’s current value 
from defence spending at all levels. However, insufficient public data made objective analysis and 
determination of what and how to measure value challenging. The DWP is the first public 
 
15 Hisham Noor (director for the Malaysian Institute for Defence and Security, Ministry of Defence, 
Malaysia). Interviewed by Kogila Balakrishnan, May 4, 2020. 
16 The ADMM includes ASEAN plus Australia, New Zealand, Japan, India, Republic of Korea, and China. 
17 The most popular overseas universities and colleges include those such as Sandhurst, Berkshire, Royal 
College of Defence and Security (RCDS), UK Defence Academy, Naval Postgraduate School United 
States, U.S. Military Academy (West Point), Australian Defence Force Training Centre (ADFA) and 
Australian Defence College. 
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document that has discussed the value derived from defence spending to the Malaysian public, 
despite claims that the content differs little from previously classified defence policy documents.  
In the case of Malaysia, the primary role of defence was measured by the state of readiness of 
the MAF. There were several challenges beyond the author’s limitations in obtaining sufficient 
data, such as operational activity irregularity in the systematic and consistent collection of such 
data, as well as tenuous political will in investing resources to attain higher levels of readiness.  
The outcome from the secondary role of defence concerning socio-economic prosperity resulting 
from defence spending has also been minimal. After almost 50 years of government investment 
into defence industrialisation, offsets and R&D, results have been modest. There is a lack of 
appetite for enhancing innovative capability, addressing competitiveness and penetrating the 
global market within the defence industry sector. Positive outcomes include spin-offs from 
defence spending to developing commercial supply chains and skills development in high-
technology sectors. Further, outcomes from HRDF activities were positive where the MAF has 
successfully supported critical missions abroad.  
Finally, outcomes from the tertiary role of defence regarding soft power projection has led to an 
increased status for the Malaysian defence sector in defence diplomacy, such that this successful 
projection as a friendly nation means it is often invited by major powers to broker peace talks in 
the region. In recent years, Malaysia has also increased its level of joint exercises with 
neighbouring ASEAN countries and major powers in the region and globally. Malaysia has been 
very successful in keeping alive the dynamics and contributing actively to multilateral platforms 
such as ADMM, ADMM Plus and FPDA.           
The valuation framework can be very fuzzy, and their respective explanations are subjective—
they require careful scrutiny and are not a “one-size-fits-all” framework. Further, the framework is 
culturally and socially dependent on what each country would like to identify as value derived from 
defence spending. We still have problems appraising value when it comes to buying defence or 
deterrence. Hence, this framework is not perfect and represents a general template that may 
provide a useful starting point when initiating value measurements for the defence sector. As 
previously mentioned, it is hard to measure value in public service delivery, let alone defence. 
These indicators provide guidance that should be used selectively and modified to the strategic 
context of each country.  
There are several issues that the defence sector should consider when attempting to improve 
value measurement in the future. First, it is important to critically evaluate existing policy and 
processes that are in place to capture and manage data. Data could be highly sensitive and will 
require careful handling and classification. It is also necessary to have at least a basic platform 
with the right architecture to capture data on the value of defence spending. Success in this area 
would be seen through the ability to publish yearly reports on value derived from defence spending 
based on systematic analysis. However, the overall process of realising the importance of 
communicating value from defence spending must be driven by strong leadership that believes 
such efforts are vital. At the same time, there must be a bottom-up process that works to minimise 
the implementation gap that hinders defence value maximisation.  
The TDV framework could be used as a preliminary model by other countries in Southeast 
Asia, the region, and globally to examine defence value, understand the strengths and 
weaknesses that arise from the value evaluation process, and use the outcomes to develop or 
improve on existing defence policy and implementation. The defence community, especially 
politicians, policy-makers and the armed forces must recognise the importance in demonstrating 
value from defence spending, especially in a world where defence budget allocations are 
increasingly contested. The TDV framework is a work in progress and can be a useful public 
 
 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 138 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
policy tool used by the defence community to drive the idea of demonstrating value through 
defence spending. 
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